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Wider	Still	and	Wider:	
Corporate	Constitutionalism	Unbounded	
	
DAVID	ARMITAGE	
	 Will	 Pettigrew’s	 article,	 “Corporate	 Constitutionalism	 and	 the	 Dialogue	between	the	Global	and	the	Local	in	Seventeenth	Century	English	History,”	presents	an	 excitingly	 expansive	 research	 agenda	 that	 cuts	 across	 many	 of	 the	 traditional	divisions	 of	 early	 modern	 history:	 domestic	 and	 foreign,	 internal	 and	 imperial,	constitutional	and	commercial,	English	and	British,	British	and	European,	national	and	 global.	 The	 scope	 of	 this	 programme	 is	 as	 breathtaking	 as	 it	 is	 thought-provoking.	 It	 might	 therefore	 seem	 perverse	 to	 ask	 for	 something	 still	 more	ambitious,	 as	 I	 shall	 do	 in	 these	 brief	 remarks.	However,	 in	 gesturing	 towards	 an	even	greater	vision	of	what	Pettigrew	calls	“corporate	constitutionalism,”	my	hope	is	to	clarify	rather	than	to	complicate	the	 immense	task	he	has	set	himself	and	his	collaborators	on	the	“Political	Economies	of	International	Commerce”	project.1		That	project	is	only	the	most	visible	and	prominent	current	manifestation	of	what	Pettigrew	calls	 the	“constitutional	 turn”	 in	the	history	of	corporations.	Three	motives	 behind	 that	 turn	 stand	 out.	 First,	 there	 is	 the	 presentist	 anxiety	 over	corporate	power,	even	corporate	corruption,	on	a	worldwide	scale	since	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008.2	Second,	there	is	the	more	exactingly	historical	movement	to	recover	 the	multiple	similarities,	particularly	 in	 the	early	modern	period,	between	trading	 corporations	 and	 sovereign	 states,	 or	 what	 are	 now	 coming	 to	 be	 called	“company-states”.3	And	third	there	is	the	still	more	fundamental,	but	as	yet	less	well																																																									1 	University	 of	 Kent,	 “Political	 Economies	 of	 International	 Commerce”:	http://peic.org.uk/.	2 	Joshua	 Barkan,	 Corporate	 Sovereignty:	 Law	 and	 Government	 under	 Capitalism	(Minneapolis:	 University	 of	 Minnesota	 Press,	 2013),	 is	 a	 sophisticated	 treatment	explicitly	tied	to	recent	events.	3	Philip	 J.	 Stern,	 The	 Company-State:	 Corporate	 Sovereignty	 and	 the	 Early	 Modern	
Foundations	of	the	British	Empire	in	India	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011);	Arthur	 Weststeijn,	 “The	 VOC	 as	 a	 Company-State:	 Debating	 Seventeenth-Century	Dutch	Colonial	Expansion,”	Itinerario	38	(2014):	13–34.	
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developed,	understanding	that	companies	and	states	were	divergent	species	within	the	genus	of	corporations,	in	the	Roman-law	sense	of	collective	bodies	represented	as	persons	 for	 the	purpose	of	 fulfilling	duties	 and	bearing	 rights.4	Taken	 together,	these	 three	 impulses—reaching	 back	 respectively	 over	 the	 courte,	moyenne	 and	
longue	durées—suggest	 that	 the	 only	mystery	 about	 the	 constitutional	 turn	 is	 not	why	it	is	happening	at	all,	but	why	it	has	taken	so	long	to	gather	speed.	One	 reason	 for	 the	 hesitancy	 may	 be	 the	 default	 assumption,	 particularly	among	modern	historians,	that	“corporation”	means	primarily	or	even	exclusively	a	commercial	 body.	 This	 is	 perhaps	 a	 mistake	 few	 people	 brought	 up	 in	 English	boroughs	 or	 towns—those	 municipal	 “corporations”	 that	 supply	 public	 services	such	 as	 water,	 swimming-baths	 and	 street-cleaning—might	make.	 Nonetheless,	 it	remains	widespread.	Pettigrew	is	not	entirely	innocent	of	it,	as	the	opening	lines	of	his	 article	 invoke	 present	 discontents	 about	 “corporations”	 in	 this	 specifically	financial	 sense.	 Such	 a	 truncated	 definition	 of	 the	 corporation	 is	 clearly	anachronistic	for	the	period	Pettigrew	focuses	on	even	if	he,	along	with	many	other	present-minded	commentators,	implicitly	views	the	seventeenth	century	as	the	long	birth	moment	of	the	modern	corporation.5		A	 slightly	 longer	 perspective	might	 question	 that	 chronology.	 As	 Pettigrew	notes,	 even	 among	 the	 subset	 of	 English	 overseas	 commercial	 corporations	 he	studies	were	sixteenth-century	foundations,	pre-eminently	the	Muscovy	Company.6	Moreover,	 for	 all	 their	pretensions	 to	perpetuity,	 few	of	 the	 early	modern	English	commercial	companies	staggered	into	the	modern	age,	the	latter-day	revival	of	the	East	India	Company	as	a	high-end	gift-shop	notwithstanding.7	What	Pettigrew	terms																																																									4	F.	 W.	 Maitland,	 State,	 Trust	 and	 Corporation,	 eds.	 David	 Runciman	 and	 Magnus	Ryan	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003).	5	Nick	Robins,	The	Corporation	that	Changed	the	World:	How	the	East	India	Company	
Shaped	 the	 Modern	 Multinational,	 2nd	 edition	 (London:	 Pluto,	 2012);	 William	Dalrymple,	The	Anarchy:	How	a	Corporation	Replaced	the	Mughal	Empire,	1756–1803	(London:	Bloomsbury,	2016).	6 	Thomas	 Stuart	 Willan,	 The	 Early	 History	 of	 the	 Russia	 Company,	 1553–1603	(Manchester:	 Manchester	 University	 Press,	 1956).	 A	 new	 history	 of	 the	 Muscovy	Company	is	a	major	desideratum.	7	The	East	India	Company	Fine	Foods:	http://www.eicfinefoods.com/.	
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“corporate	 longevity”	 might	 actually	 appear	 to	 be	 rather	 shortlived	 sub	 specie	
aeternitatis.		The	vision	of	 the	 corporation	and	 its	 relation	 to	 constitutionalism	could	be	even	more	 expansive	 in	 time.	 Even	 in	 purely	 English	 context,	 this	 would	 entail	 a	very	“long”	seventeenth	century	going	back	at	least	to	1553	(and	the	foundation	of	the	Muscovy	Company)	and	 forward	well	 into	 the	nineteenth-century	afterlives	of	the	 East	 India	 Company	 and	 the	 Hudson’s	 Bay	 Company,	 for	 instance,	 or	 to	 the	recrudescence	of	private	companies	such	as	the	British	South	Africa	Company,	and	the	 Royal	 Niger	 Company	 in	 the	 “scramble”	 for	 Africa	 and	 beyond.	 It	 might	 also	demand	unpicking	the	alleged	elective	affinity	between	corporations	and	capitalism	by	 unpacking	 the	 multiple	 early	 modern	 links	 between	 commercial	 corporations	and	 other	 forms	 of	 corporation:	 for	 example,	 states,	 chartered	 towns	 and	 the	London	livery	companies,	some	of	which	(like	the	Clothworkers’	Company),	through	their	promotion	of	 long-distance	trade,	had	an	extra-European	 impact	even	before	the	dawn	of	the	seventeenth	century.8		These	various	links	also	need	to	be	put	into	the	context	of	the	longer	history	of	corporations	going	back	to	Roman	law:	 in	this	regard,	recent	studies	of	Thomas	Hobbes’s	 conceptions	 of	 corporations	 (and	 his	 connections	 to	 the	 Virginia	Company)	 provide	 models	 for	 articulating	 the	 history	 of	 early	 modern	 political	thought	with	the	history	of	corporate	personhood	in	all	its	myriad	forms.9	To	focus	only	on	trading	corporations	assumes	what	needs	to	be	explained:	that	is,	why	only	some	of	the	proliferation	of	corporations	in	early	modern	England	turned	outward,	beyond	 the	 realm,	 as	 commercial	 organisations.	 Other	 legally	 constituted	 agents	could	operate	in	the	extra-European	world:	naval	captains,	army	officers,	clerics	and																																																									8	G.	D.	Ramsey,	“Clothworkers,	Merchant	Adventurers,	and	Richard	Hakluyt,”	English	
Historical	 Review	 92	 (1977):	 504–21;	 on	 the	 London	 companies,	 1400–1900,	 see	“Records	of	London’s	Livery	Companies	Online”:	http://www.londonroll.org/home.	9	Noel	Malcolm,	“Hobbes,	Sandys,	and	the	Virginia	Company,”	in	Malcolm,	Aspects	of	
Hobbes	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2002),	 pp.	 53–79;	 Mathias	 Hein	 Jessen,	“The	 State	 of	 the	 Company:	 Corporations,	 Colonies	 and	 Companies	 in	 Leviathan,”	
Journal	 of	 Intellectual	 History	 and	 Political	 Thought	 1	 (2012):	 56–85;	 Patricia	Springborg,	 “Hobbes,	 Donne	 and	 the	 Virginia	 Company:	 Terra	 Nullius	 and	 ‘The	Bulimia	of	Dominion’,”	History	of	Political	Thought	36	(2015):	113–64.	
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consuls,	 for	 instance.10	Why,	 then,	did	 the	English	crown	 increasingly	multiply	and	sub-contract	 the	marks	of	sovereignty—among	them	treaty-making,	 the	powers	of	war	and	peace,	adjudication,	territorial	claim-making	and	the	minting	of	coinage—to	such	corporations	in	the	wider	world	within	and	beyond	Europe?	And	what	effect	might	 that	 selection	 process	 have	 had	 on	 the	 constitution	 of	 sovereignty	 within	Britain	itself?	There	have	been	intermittent	answers	to	such	questions	over	the	years—for	example,	 regarding	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 Virginia	 Company,	 the	 Providence	 Island	Company	 or	 the	 founding	 of	 Pennsylvania11—but	 we	 still	 lack	 a	 convincingly	comprehensive	 narrative	 of	 developments	 across	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	Constructing	 that	 story	 might	 also	 demand	 a	 robust	 counterfactual	 from	 beyond	England	 or	 Britain.	 Fortunately,	 there	 are	 factual	 counterfactuals	 to	 hand,	 in	 the	histories	 of	 other	 early	 modern	 European	 countries	 that	 deployed	 commercial	companies	overseas.	These	included	not	just	those	Pettigrew	lists—“Spain,	Portugal,	Holland,	 France,	 Denmark,	 and	 Sweden”—but	 also	 Brandenburg	 and	 Scotland	 as	well.	 Such	 comparisons	 could	 reveal	 what,	 if	 anything,	 was	 peculiar	 about	 the	English	case,	in	the	long	seventeenth	century	or	beyond.	The	Netherlands	provides	the	 most	 obvious	 parallel	 in	 the	 VOC,	 but	 the	 burgeoning	 scholarship	 on	 French	commercial	 companies,	 notably	 the	 eighteenth-century	 Compagnie	 des	 Indes,	should	clarify	whether	England	was	part	of	pan-European	developments	articulated	on	 a	 global	 scale.12	This	 suggestion	 might	 place	 greater	 demands	 on	 Pettigrew’s	project	than	it	can	immediately	bear.	However,	it	does	affirm	the	logic	of	one	of	his																																																									10	On	consular	jurisdiction,	see	especially	Tristan	M.	Stein,	“The	Mediterranean	and	the	 English	 Empire	 of	 Trade,	 1660–1748”	 (Ph.D.	 dissertation,	 Harvard	 University,	2012).	11	Karen	Ordahl	Kupperman,	Providence	Island,	1630–1641:	The	Other	Puritan	Colony	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1993);	David	Armitage,	“Greater	Britain:	A	Useful	Category	of	Historical	Analysis?,”	American	Historical	Review	104	(1999):	441	and	n.	72.	12	Felicia	Gottmann,	“French-Asian	Connections:	The	Compagnie	des	Indes,	France’s	Eastern	Trade,	and	New	Directions	in	Historical	Scholarship,”	The	Historical	Journal	56	 (2013):	 537–52;	 Elizabeth	 Cross,	 “The	 Compagnie	 des	 Indes	 and	 the	 Fate	 of	Commercial	 Empire	 in	 the	 French	 Revolution”	 (Ph.D.	 dissertation,	 Harvard	University,	in	progress).	
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own	 questions—“How	 could	 a	 constitutional	 approach	 to	 Dutch,	 French,	 Spanish,	and	Portuguese	trading	corporations	integrate	European	examples?”—by	seeking	to	integrate	 English	 corporate	 constitutionalism	 into	 a	 firmly	 pan-European	framework,	much	as	 Jack	P.	Greene	twenty-five	years	ago	traced	constitutionalism	in	an	imperial	and	trans-Atlantic		context	or	Linda	Colley	has	more	recently	done	for	anglophone	constitution-making	in	global	perspective.13	The	contemporary	stakes	of	Pettigrew’s	larger	project	are	clear.	Its	place	on	the	leading	edge	of	current	historiography	is	also	evident.	Its	relation	to	the	longer,	more	variegated	history	of	 legal	corporatism	is	 for	the	moment	 less	obvious.	After	all,	it	was	only	in	the	nineteenth	century,	starting	in	the	Anglo-American	world,	that	the	meaning	of	 the	 term	 “corporation”	narrowed	 to	mean	mostly	 an	 incorporated	business	entity.14	It	made	sense	to	distinguish	commercial	bodies	from	other	species	of	corporation	only	when	the	spheres	of	politics	and	the	economy	had	separated,	a	process	that	had	barely	begun	in	the	seventeenth	century.15	Before	that	separation,	the	term	“corporate	constitutionalism”	might	even	seem	to	be	a	pleonasm,	covering	corporations	aggregate	and	corporations	sole,	 from	the	Crown	to	chartered	 towns	and	companies	and	a	great	deal	between.	Whether	corporate	constitutionalism	is	a	useful	category	of	historical	analysis	remains	to	be	seen:	a	generous	focus—broad	in	space,	 deep	 in	 time—will	 be	 essential	 to	 assess	 its	 utility.	 In	 the	words	 of	 one	 of	Britain’s	 unofficial	 anthems,	 which	 aptly	 places	 a	 vision	 of	 freedom	 in	 a	 global	sphere	of	action,	“wider	still	and	wider”	should	its	“bounds	be	set.”																																																									13	Jack	P.	Greene,	Peripheries	and	Center:	Constitutional	Development	in	the	Extended	
Polities	 of	 the	 British	 Empire	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 1607–1788	 (New	 York:	 W.	W.	Norton,	1990);	Linda	Colley,	“Empires	of	Writing:	Britain,	America	and	Constitutions,	1776–1848,”	Law	and	History	Review	32	(2014):	237–66.	14 	Oscar	 Handlin	 and	 Mary	 F.	 Handlin,	 “Origins	 of	 the	 American	 Business	Corporation,”	 Journal	 of	 Economic	 History	 5	 (1945):	 1–23;	 Jason	 Kaufman,	
“Corporate	 Law	 and	 the	 Sovereignty	 of	 States,”	 American	 Sociological	 Review	 73	(2008):	402–25.	15	Istvan	Hont,	 Jealousy	of	Trade:	 International	Competition	and	 the	Nation-state	 in	
Historical	Perspective	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	 2005);	 David	 Singh	 Grewal,	 The	 Invention	 of	 the	 Economy:	 The	 Origins	 of	
Economic	Thought	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press,	forthcoming).		
